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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
This decision, to be read on its unique facts, is a meritorious ap-
plication of a court's authority to prevent misuse of summary pro-
ceedings.
DoLrE v. Dow CHEMICAL Co.
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent developments.
In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 88 the Court of Appeals revolu-
tionized New York law by eliminating the active-passive test for
indemnification and allowing equitable apportionment of damages
among joint tortfeasors based on relative responsibility. In Kelly v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 84 the Court confirmed that a Dole claim
can be made by cross-claim against a co-defendant as well as by im-
pleader of an unjoined co-tortfeasor or by a separate indemnity
action.'8 5
A number of New York courts'88 and one federal court'8 7 have
also permitted defendants to seek a Dole apportionment by counter-
claim against plaintiffs suing in a representative capacity or in more
than one capacity. The decision with the greatest potential impact has
waiver of these proceedings be expressed in writing as a Statute of Frauds protection, not
designed to interfere with a court's power to prevent abuse of summary proceedings.
For examples of waiver by a landlord, see Fanchild Investors, Inc. v. Cohen, 43 Misc.
2d 39, 250 N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1964); Valentine Gardens Coopera-
tive, Inc. v. Oberman, 237 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1963).
183 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALiANy L. REv.
154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 185 (1972). For an extended
discussion of the ramifications of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B McKINNEY's
CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 205-38 (1972).
184 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1972).
185 For discussion of the problem of the waiver of Dole rights, see 7B MCKINNEY's
CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 230-32 (1972) (strongest case for waiver where tortfeasor
fails to cross-claim against co-defendant); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution
in New York Law, 47 ST. Jon's L. REv. 185, 208 (1972) (waiver problem should be avoided
by resolving all issues arising from breach of duty in one action).
In Henriquez v. Mission Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 782, 339 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1972), the defendants sought a Dole charge based on the service of a notice of
"vouching in" after the jury had been selected. Since the plaintiffs received notice of the
defendants' claim, the court treated it as a counterclaim, but disallowed it for laches,
without prejudice to a subsequent action for Dole indemnity.
The common-law device of "vouching in" is "simply a notice that an action is
pending, and an offer to the vouchee to come in and defend, in default thereof the
voucher will hold him liable." Bouleris v. Cherry-Burrell Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 318, 319, 256
N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
186 Moreno v. Galdorisi, 39 App. Div. 2d 450, 336 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1972); Meade
v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972); Yarish v.
Dowling, 70 Misc. 2d 467, 333 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1972) (mem.); DeLucia
v. Bundock, 168 N.Y.L.J. 12, July 19, 1972, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County);
Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972). In
Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 333 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972)
(mem.), the court allowed the defendants' "cross-complaint" against a co-plaintiff.
187 Sorrentino v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 1308 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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been Sorrentino v. United States,88 wherein the United States District
Court for New York's Eastern District allowed a Dole counterclaim
against the plaintiff-father of an infant plaintiff who had been struck
and injured by a vehicle owned by the defendant, the basis of the
claim being allegedly negligent parental supervision. The Supreme
Court, New York County, however, in Marrero v. Just Cab Corp.,8 9
recently disallowed the assertion of such a counterclaim, holding that,
in the absence of a showing of special circumstances requiring close
supervision, "a pleading which makes a charge of negligence against
parents of an eight-year-old child, based on unattendance alone, fails
to set forth a cause of action for negligence."'190 The court reasoned
that mere unattendance is deemed insufficient to prove parental negli-
gence even if the injured child is non sui juris,191 and that automatic
allowance of such a Dole counterclaim in accident cases involving
infant plaintiffs could inundate the courts.192
Whether Dole is fully retroactive remains unsettled. Clearly, under
Kelly, it applies to all actions decided at the trial or appellate level
after March 22, 1972, the date of the Dole decision.193 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, followed this in Moreno v. Galdorisi,19
when it unanimously allowed the defendants in an automobile negli-
gence action to amend their answer to include a counterclaim for Dole
indemnity against a co-plaintiff-driver. 195 The court did not reach "the
question as to the application of Dole to trials concluded or in which
judgment has already been entered."'m
If Dole is held to apply to cases previously decided, an indepen-
dent action for Dole indemnity will be available and free from the bar
188 Id.
189 71 Misc. 2d 474, 336 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
190d. at 477, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 304. Accord, Collazo v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface
Transit Operating Authority, 72 Misc. 2d 946, 339 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1972) (5 -year-old infant plaintiff). The Court of Appeals abolished the doctrine of
intrafamily immunity for nonwiliful torts in Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). The Collazo court also argued that the primary
rationale of Gelbman-that the existence of compulsory automobile insurance means
that, in many suits between parent and child, the insurer is the real party in interest-is
inapplicable to the Sorrentino-Marrero context.
191 Id. at 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 303, citing Ryczko v. Klenotich, 204 App. Div. 693, 198
N.Y.S. 473 (3d Dep't 1923).
192 Id. at 477, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
193 Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29 n.8, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 n.3,
334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 n.3 (1972) ('We, of course, give effect to the law as it exists at the time
of our decision.").
194 39 App. Div. 2d 450, 336 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't 1972).
195 The Dole counterclaim against the driver applies to his co-plaintiff passenger's
cause of action. His own cause of action would be defeated by a showing of negligence on
his part.
196 Id. at 453, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
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of the statute of limitations if commenced within six years after satis-
faction of the original judgment.197
Prior to Dole, a tortfeasor lacked standing to appeal a dismissal of
the complaint as to a co-defendant. 198 The rationale for this rule was
that the tortfeasor had not lost any right to contribution under CPLR
1401 since he had not paid more than his pro rata share of a joint
judgment. The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Stein v.
Whitehead,'" has now unanimously held that under Dole and Kelly
a defendant "is a party aggrieved by a dismissal of the complaint
against a codefendant and he consequently has standing to appeal from
such a determination. 200 The court reasoned that a defendant's right
to a Dole adjudication exists at the time of trial; this right is not incho-
ate until his payment of a joint judgment.201
Another immunity has come under scrutiny as a result of Dole.
Mills v. Gabriel202 permits an absentee vehicle owner to recover his
own damages without imputation of his driver's negligence pursuant
to the vicarious liability statute.2 0 In Cadran v. Fanni,'°4 a defendant-
owner and a defendant-driver sought to counterclaim for Dole indem-
nity against a plaintiff-owner and a plaintiff-driver. The Suffolk County
District Court held that there was "no legal basis to compel contribu-
tion from the plaintiff absentee owner [for any liability of his driver
as joint tortfeasor indemnitor] although he may be liable for damages
to the absentee defendant owner, ' 205 citing the Mills immunity and
197 The statute of limitations for contract actions is six years from the time the cause
of action accrues. CPLR 213. An indemnity action accrues when the original judgment is
paid. Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 125-26, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589, 595 (2d Dep't 1964);
Lutz Feed Co. v. Audet & Co., 72 Misc. 2d 28, 30, 337 N.Y.S.2d 852, 855 (Sup. Ct. Delaware
County 1972).
198 Price v. Ryan, 255 N.Y. 16, 173 N.E. 907 (1930). Cf. Hughes v. Parkhurst, 284 App.
Div. 757, 134 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1954) (tortfeasor lacked standing to seek to have
verdict in favor of a co-defendant set aside). Baidach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d 128, 164 N.E.2d
373, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959), established the rule that a tortfeasor who paid a joint judgment
after a reversal as to a co-defendant lacked standing to appeal. CPLR 1402(a) allows a
tortfeasor who has paid a joint judgment to oppose an appeal by a co-defendant and to
contest an appeal from any reversal or modification. CPLR 1402(b) overturned the Baidach
rule.
199 40 App. Div. 2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821 (2d Dep't 1972).
200 Id. at 92, 337 N.Y.S2d at 825. "Under Dole, each of the tortfeasors should have full
appellate rights against the others without regard to whether there has been a joint judg-
ment or not." 7B McKinNEt's CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 229 (1972).
20140 App. Div. 2d at 91-92, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
202 259 App. Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2d Dep't), afJ'd, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E2d 512 (1940).
203 N.Y. VEH. & TRA. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
204 72 Misc. 2d 1, 338 N.Y.S.2d 532 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
205 Id. at 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 537. See Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25,
30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1972) ("Nor, for example, are we concerned
with issues involving vicarious liability, to which the active-passive dichotomy classically
and appropriately belonged).
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adopting the analogy of complete employer immunity under the Work-
men's Compensation Law in the absence of an independent tort lia-
bility constituting a basis for indemnification.
The effect of Dole on settlement rights was the subject of Miche-
lucci v. Bennett.2 6 During the course of trial, the plaintiff settled with
two defendants, reserving the right to continue against the remaining
defendant, who subsequently impleaded the ex-defendants for a Dole
apportionment. The Supreme Court, Washington County, denied a
motion to dismiss the third-party complaint since the defendant was
"not a party to the release nor bound by its terms .... -"207 The court
noted that the issue of the third-party defendant's right to credit for the
settlement sum is properly raised in the third-party action or a subse-
quent action.20s
Similarly, Professor David D. Siegel has argued that a discon-
tinuance by the plaintiff against one tortfeasor should not bar a cross-
claim by a co-defendant for a Dole apportionment. 2 9 In Evans v. City
of New York,210 the plaintiff discontinued his negligence action with
prejpdice against one defendant, which stipulated that it continued as
a party as to its co-defendant's cross-claim. After a $150,000 verdict was
rendered against the co-defendant, the Supreme Court, Kings County,
shifted 90% of the liability to the severed defendant on the cross claim.
Questioning the plaintiff's motives and finding the verdict contrary to
the weight of the evidence, the court stated that it would have set aside
the verdict were a Dole apportionment unavailable.2 11
Dole established a comparative negligence rule among defendants,
but its direct impact on the plaintiff is not so readily discernible. Each
tortfeasor remains jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.212 In
200 71 Misc. 2d 347, 535 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. Washington County 1972).
207 Id. at 349, 335 N.Y.S2d at 969-70.
208Id., 335 N.Y.S.2d at 970. Professor David D. Siegel has noted that a defendant who
settles should require the plaintiff to agree to indemnify him for any Dole liability in
excess of the settlement sum. "Indeed, unless such an agreement is made, what motive has
[a tortfeasor] to settle at all?" 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 224 (1972).
2097B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 227 (1972). Professor Siegel
cautions that the court should allow a discontinuance only where the severed defendant
agrees to continue as to his co-defendant's cross-claim.
210 72 Misc. 2d 216, 338 N.Y.S.2d 538 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
211 Id. at 221, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
212 See, e.g., Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243,
334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (1972) (Dole "does not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to
recover against any joint tort-feasor in a separate or common action the total amount of
his damage suffered and not compensated."); Liebman v. County of Westchester, 71 Misc.
2d 997, 1003, 337 N.Y.S.2d 164, 172 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972) ("[S]ince the tenor
of these pronouncements is to benefit defendants as among themselves, neither [Dole] nor
Kelly may be read as limiting plaintiffs opportunities for judgment."). The Liebman
court noted that many judges are initially charging the jury as to liability. If the jury
[Vol. 47:580
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
New York State Electric & Gas Corp. v. Waldron,213 the Supreme Court,
Broome County, upheld the plaintiff's freedom to seek recovery against
the defendant of his choice. The negligence of two defendants was
established in their prior action against two present co-defendants
whose freedom from negligence was established therein. Holding that
the prior judgment was conclusive as to the two defendant's negli-
gence 2 14 and noting that they had not cross-claimed,21 5 the court granted
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against them and severed
the action from any Dole adjudication as to all the defendants.
The Supreme Court, Delaware County, apparently extended the
reach of Dole in Lutz Feed Co. v. Audet & Co.21 6 by allowing the im-
pleader of a third party not on the indemnity basis of liability to the
defendants for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against them, but for
an alleged breach of duty owed to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff sued
its insurance agents for negligence and breach of contract in failing to
notify it of the expiration of an insurance policy which they had
agreed to maintain, the defendants alleged that the third-party defen-
dants had acted for the plaintiff and had negligently failed to advise
their principal that the policy would not be renewed. The court held
that "[s]ince the respective third-party plaintiffs and third-party defen-
dants are deemed to be joint tortfeasors, it follows under [Dole] that
the third-party complaint states a cause of action. 12 17
In Berenger v. Gottlieb,21 8 the New York City Civil Court, Kings
County, became at least the second court2 19 to discern an immediate
impact of Dole on the plaintiff. After surveying the history of the
contributory negligence rule and examining the import of Dole, the
court concluded that "the doctrine of contributory negligence has not
survived the Court of Appeals decision in Dole."220 Thus, it refused
the defendants' motion to set aside a verdict requiring the plaintiff to
bear 20% of his loss.
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, reluctantly disapproved
decides in favor of recovery, it is instructed to make a percentage allocation of fault. The
damages phase of such a split trial follows this liability-apportionment phase. Id. at
1005-06, 837 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
213 72 Misc. 2d 78, 338 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972).
214 Id. at 80, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
215 Id., 338 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
218 72 Misc. 2d 28, 337 N.YS.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. Delaware County 1972).
217 Id. at 30, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
218 Id. 349, 838 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1972).
219 See Murray v. Lidell, Index No. 1221-69 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Richmond County,
September 27, 1972) (jury was instructed to decide the comparative negligence of plaintiff
and defendant).
220 72 Misc. 2d at 353, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
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such a holding in Carhart v. Albright,221 where it denied the defen-
dant's counterclaim against the plaintiff for his contributory negligence,
stating:
[T]he defendant misconceives the doctrine formulated by the
Court of Appeals in Dole .. . although he has undoubtedly dis-
cerned the trend, and inevitable result, of its holding, i.e., the
ultimate adoption of the rule of comparative negligence in this
State.222
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. has proved to be a challenging test of
the ingenuity of the New York courts. Most decisions applying it have
reflected the flexibility and simplicity inherent in the Dole decision.
"Justice and equity triumph under Dole."223 Its legacy will be a fairer
and more realistic tort system, which should ultimately include a
comparative negligence rule.
221 Id. 23, 338 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1972).
222 Id. at 24, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
223 Evans v. City of New York, 72 Misc. 2d 216, 222, 338 N.Y.S.2d 538, 543 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1972).
